

28 Nov 87

1958-60 - 870

I heard certain secrets. I have
affected of thinking on important matters:
the prob of more VNs

- of genocide, terrorism, torture
by US

- of environmental catastrophe
- of new "crises"
- of US FV and small war wars

- of all-out TN war

- of loss of central, ^{false alarm} ~~function~~,
+ of escalation to new wars
and all-out war.

~~I have revealed~~

I propose to share those secrets.

Some I have revealed earlier

PP. Some have become widely known.
others (unrelated) most are not; some have
not before been revealed.

I have not heard this out systematically,
nor drawn their implications.

I have not heard, unrelated hints.
What is kept secret has certain characteristics;
it relates to certain definite activities, above all -
(Pain.)

To know the secrets is not to know
hidden parts of a foreign policy.

it is to discover ~~the~~ a secret foreign
policy (and domestic ~~power~~ / internal structure)
which

Note what has just been revealed about
CIT, after 25 years:

- my news
- Rusk / transcript
- SC will
- Cuban role

What was not publicly known in 1962-68:

== (of signif.)
==
==

Old interpretations are inevitable, some may be
better, later ones will be different (for me, too):

↳ but they must come to terms with other
secrets; and those who regret mine in favour of old ones
should ask if they know these the and how the but?

My recents:

1. C+C: loose control
 2. War plans: - nature
- } STABILITY PROBLEM
PREEMPTION

- casualties projected

-(~~that~~ we want: unforeseen

3. C II - risks

risks accepted

4. Crisis study: risks
patterns

5. VN Escalation: Conspiracy* 1964-65 (lies)

6. VN Escalation as process: RT 1966-73-75.
(despite evidence and
disinformation troops)

7. N's secret plan to win. (1964)

8. N's use of secret plan, plans, WG

9. N's nuclear threats (^{known} 1974).

Idm: public (little-known) knowledge: after 1974

- Chile, Cuba (Morgue), CIA, Assass., Indonesia
Rhodesia, Iran (South Africa, Israel...) (JFK assass?)

- Old nuclear PU threats (inc. Hiroshima).

- as 1966 Nic (WACL)

- Construction of Instability (Hypothetical problem 1958-62)
CF, SDI

- Revelation on Cuba II - Challenger, Challenge

- MILGRAM; KELMAN; KANNEMAN - Jurek; BISHOPS (CD) (movement)

* PDS: I oscillate between seeing policy-process

as a small (large) conspiracy, and something much
more institutional and coherent. Like particle waves

My reaction to "Wangpan Conference":
8 Feb 88
(after talk with
big Hersh)

1) I identify with the man trying to save
the half-fins. I ~~assess~~ did my best to
save China, the satellites, the cities of Russia.

[But: What loyalty and helpfulness and
thickening and ideology had brought me to
that position

- that man was an "old Nazi" who
had formulated the finish statistics (accurate
hoaxing?)
- and brought me to possess the PP?]

2. How many mountings I had been in ~~that~~ like
that - at best, "eliminating targets." - ON VN

- counting them men as my colleagues
and friends (Barnet + Roshin didn't, either)
- not copying, hoarding + scheming to
release documents of crimes, plotting...

[I could have had all my shoes of
1961-~~63~~, esp 64-68]

How could I have remained an insider, kept
my mouth shut, on issues and VN?

I feel shame.

(Answers for various people, not only me:

1. — no clear channel for publication —
(Hush: no way.)
not NYT, Wash Post; not Congress, till
(Fullbright, Spring '66? I was in VN)

(Foreign? not UK. France? Effective?
(Treason)

A BOOK? Not likely.)

2. A single damning piece of paper could be
found — doesn't run with a career.

(I was first to think of a massive 'leak'.)

(No imitations.)

3. Note how little effect those who leaked
Final Solution (without documents or 'proof') had.